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Abstract
Neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable against minor adversarial
perturbations of their inputs, especially for high dimensional data under `∞ attacks.
To combat this problem, techniques like adversarial training have been employed
to obtain models which are robust on the training set. However, the robustness
of such models against adversarial perturbations may not generalize to unseen
data. To study how robustness generalizes, recent works assume that the inputs
have bounded `2-norm in order to bound the adversarial risk for `∞ attacks with
no explicit dimension dependence. In this work we focus on `∞ attacks on `∞
bounded inputs and prove margin-based bounds. Specifically, we use a compression
based approach that relies on efficiently compressing the set of tunable parameters
without distorting the adversarial risk. To achieve this, we apply the concept
of effective sparsity and effective joint sparsity on the weight matrices of neural
networks. This leads to bounds with no explicit dependence on the input dimension,
neither on the number of classes. Our results show that neural networks with
approximately sparse weight matrices not only enjoy enhanced robustness, but also
better generalization.
1 Introduction
In recent years, neural networks have been shown to be particularly vulnerable to maliciously designed
perturbations of their inputs. Such perturbed inputs are known as adversarial examples and they are
often only slightly distorted versions of the original inputs. For example, in image classification,
adversarial examples have been shown to be indistinguishable from the original image to the human
eye. This phenomena motivated several works aimed at understanding the nature of classifiers, and in
particular neural networks, in the presence of adversarial examples.
The first work discussing the vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial examples was presented
by Goodfellow et al. [11]. In that work, the authors hypothesized that this phenomena can be
explained by the excessive linearity of trained neural networks. However, such claim was refuted by
various subsequent works. For instance, in [29] it is shown that it is possible to train linear classifiers
that are resistant to adversarial attacks which stands in contrast to the linearity hypothesis. Moreover,
it is exemplified that high dimensional problems are not necessarily more sensitive to adversarial
examples. Further, [26] manipulated deep representations instead of the input and argued that the
linearity hypothesis is not sufficient to explain this type of attack. In [8], the authors suggest that the
flatness of the decision boundary is a reason for the existence of adversarial examples. In [7], the
authors propose the low flexibility of neural networks, compared to the difficulty of the classification
task, as a reason for the existence of adversarial examples. Another perspective is proposed in
[29] with the boundary tilting mechanism. It is argued that adversarial examples exist when the
decision boundary lies close to the sub-manifold of sampled data. The notion of adversarial strength
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is introduced which refers to the deviation angle between the target classifier and the nearest centroid
classifier. It is shown that the adversarial strength can be arbitrarily increased independently of the
classifier’s accuracy by tilting the boundary. [25] give another explanation arguing that over the course
of training the correctly classified samples do not have a significant impact on shaping the decision
boundary and eventually remain close to it. This phenomenon is called evolutionary stalling. In [24],
the correlation between robustness and accuracy of the classifier is studied empirically by attacking
different state-of-the-art neural networks. It is observed that higher accuracy neural networks are
more sensitive to adversarial attacks than lower accuracy ones. Other works like [19] study the
curvature of the decision boundaries around training samples. They argue that neural networks
are particularly vulnerable to universal perturbations in shared directions along which the decision
boundary is systematically positively curved. In [13, 15], evidence was given that increasing model
capacity alone can help to make neural networks more robust against adversarial attacks. Further,
it was observed that robust models (obtained by adversarial training) exhibit rather sparse weights
compared to non-robust ones. While these approaches contributed to understanding the nature of
adversarial examples, they do not consider whether the robustness of classifiers against adversarial
perturbations generalizes to unseen data.
If a classifier is robust to perturbations of the training set, can we guarantee that it will be also robust
to perturbations of the test set? This question is not particularly new. The optimization community
has studied this problem for quite some time. The work of Xu, et al. [32], studied robust regression in
Lasso, while later work [33] obtained results for support vector machines. Other works considered the
generalization properties of robust optimization in a distributional sense [28], that is when adversarial
examples are assumed to be samples from the worst possible distribution within a Wasserstein ball
around the original one. As discussed, these works provide algorithms for training various types of
classifiers with robustness guarantees. Regarding neural networks, for the case where no adversarial
perturbations are present, there exists an extensive literature on their generalization guarantees. Many
of these works are based on bounding the Rademacher complexity of the function class [3, 10, 23, 14],
while others make use of the PAC-Bayes framework [22, 21, 20]. There other works which rely in
different techniques, for instance [1] relies on compressing the weights of neural networks. Despite
this knowledge, proving robustness guarantees for neural networks remained unstudied till recently.
Initial works going into this direction studied neural networks in artificial scenarios. For instance,
Attias et al. [2] proved generalization bounds for the case when the adversary can modify a finite
number of entries per input. Following this approach, Diochnos et al. [5] showed that the number of
flipped bits required to fool almost all inputs is less thanO(√n), for the case when the input is binary
and uniformly distributed. As similar subsequent result [17] for binary inputs, proved the existence of
polynomial-time attacks that find adversarial examples of Hamming distance O(√n). Concurrently,
the work of Schmidt et al. [27] showed that the amount of data necessary to classify n-dimensional
Gaussian data grows by a factor of
√
n in the presence of an adversary. However, Cullina et al.
[4] showed that the VC-dimension of linear classifiers does not increase in the adversarial setting.
Additionally, they derived generalization guarantees for binary linear classifiers. Moreover, Montasser
et. al. [18] showed that VC-classes are learnable in the adversarial setting, but only if we refrain
from using standard empirical risk minimization approaches. Later works considered more general
scenarios. Using a PAC-Bayes approach, Farnia et al. [6] proved a generalization bound for neural
networks under `2 attacks. However, deriving bounds for attacks with bounded `∞-norm (instead of
`2-norm) is of particular interest, since most successful attacks in computer vision are of this type. In
addition, such attacks tend to be more effective for scenarios where the input dimension is large, thus
deriving generalization bounds without explicit dimension dependence is promising. Some recent
have advanced into . Since those works are closely related to this paper, we discussed them more in
detail in the following section.
1.1 Related Work
The following works address the problem of proving generalization bounds for neural networks in
the adversarial setting, where the attacker has bounded `∞ perturbations.
• Yin et al. [34] bounded the Rademacher complexity for linear classifiers and neural networks
in the adversarial setting. This lead to explicit bounds on the notion of adversarial risk for
the linear classifier, as well as neural networks. Nevertheless, such bound applied only to
neural networks with one hidden layer and relu activations.
2
• Concurrent work from Khim et al. [12] proved bounds on a surrogate of the adversarial
risk. In that work, the authors use the so-called tree transform on the function class to
derive their results. Under the assumption that the original inputs have `2 bounded norm, the
authors prove generalization bounds with no explicit dimension dependence in the binary
classification setting. However, the authors extend this to K-class classification by incurring
an additional factor K on their bound.
• Later work from Tu et al. [31] formulated generalization in the adversarial setting as a
minimax problem. Their proposed framework is more general than previous ones in the
sense that it can be applied to support vector machines and principal component analysis, as
well as neural networks. However, for neural networks this approach yielded a generalization
bound with explicit dimension dependence.
One common assumption shared by these works is that the inputs come from a distribution with
bounded `2-norm, which is a weaker notion than assuming `∞ bounded inputs.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this work, we study the problem of bounding the generalization error of multi-layer neural
networks under `∞ attacks, where we assume that the original inputs have `∞ bounded norm. Using
a compression approach, we obtain bounds with no explicit dependence on the input dimension or
the number of classes. We summarize our contributions as follows.
• We prove generalization bounds in the presence of adversarial perturbations of bounded
`∞-norm under the assumption that the input distribution has bounded `∞-norm as well.
This is an improvement with respect to recent works where the input is assumed to be `2
bounded.
• We extended the compression approach from [1] by incorporating the notion of effective
sparsity. Using this technique we prove that the capacity of neural networks, under adver-
sarial perturbations, is bounded by the effective sparsity and effective joint sparsity of its
weight matrices. This result has no explicit dimension dependence, neither it depends on the
number of classes. We show that approximately sparse weights not only improve robustness
against `∞ bounded adversarial perturbations, but they provide better generalization as well.
• We corroborate our result with a small experiment on the MNIST dataset, where the bound
correlates with adversarial risk. We observe that adversarial training significantly decreases
the bound, while standard training does not. Similarly, adversarial training seems to decrease
both, effective sparsity and effective joint sparsity, as predicted by our result.
1.3 Notation
We introduce first the notation used in this chapter and some of the basic definitions needed throughout
this chapter. The letters x,y, . . . are used for vectors, A,B, . . . for matrices and X ,Y, . . . for sets.
We denote the set {1, . . . , n} by [n] for n ∈ N. For any vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)T ∈ Rn and p > 0,
the `p-norm of x is denoted by ‖x‖p. The notation Bnp,ε is used to refer to an n-dimensional `p ball
of size ε, that is the set Bnp,ε = {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖p ≤ ε}. For any matrix A = (a1, . . . ,an2) ∈ Rn1×n2
and p, q > 0, its operator p-norm is denoted by ‖A‖p and its mixed (p, q)-norm by ‖A‖p,q. These
norms are given by
‖A‖p = sup‖x‖p≤1
‖Ax‖p and ‖A‖p,q =
∥∥∥∥(‖a1‖p , . . . , ‖an2‖p)T∥∥∥∥
q
.
Finally, we use the compact notation O˜(n) := O(n log n) to ignore logarithmic factors.
2 Problem Setup
We start with the standard margin-based statistical learning framework. Let X be the feature space,
Y the label space, and D : X × Y → [0, 1] a probability measure. In this work, it is assumed that all
instances x ∈ X have `∞-norm bounded by 1, that is X ⊆ Bn∞,1 ⊂ Rn. Without loss of generality,
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let the label space be Y = {1, 2, . . . , |Y|}. Using these notions, a classifier is defined through its so
called score function f : Rn → R|Y| such that the predicted label is argmaxj∈Y [f(·)]j . Moreover,
given an instance (x, y) ∈ X × Y , the classification margin is defined as
`(f ;x, y) = [f(x)]y −max
j 6=y
[f(x)]j .
In this manner, a positive margin implies correct classification. Then, for any distribution D the
expected margin loss with margin γ ≥ 0 is defined as Lγ(f) = P(x,y)∼D [`(f ;x, y) ≤ γ] .
In this paper, we study the case where an adversary is present. This adversary has access to the input
x and is allowed to add a perturbation η with `∞-norm bounded by some ε ≥ 0 (i.e., η ∈ Bnp,ε) such
that the classification margin is as small as possible. This perturbed input x+ η is usually known as
an adversarial example. Furthermore, let us define the margin under adversarial perturbations as
`ε(f ;x, y) = inf
η∈Bn∞,ε
`(f ;x+ η, y) .
This leads to the definition of adversarial margin loss:
Lεγ(f) = P(x,y)∼D [`ε(f ;x, y) ≤ γ] .
Let S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} be the training set composed of m instances drawn independently
from D. Using these instances we define L̂εγ(f) = 1m
∑m
i=1 1 (`ε(f ;xi, yi) ≤ γ) as the empirical
estimate of Lεγ(f), where 1 (·) denotes the indicator function. Note that Lε0(f) and L̂ε0(f) are the
expected risk and training error under adversarial perturbations, respectively.
For many classifiers, such as deep neural networks, the score function f belongs to a complicated
function class F , which usually has more sample complexity than the size of the training set. Even
without the presence of an adversary, it is challenging to bound the generalization error, given by the
difference L0(f)− L̂γ(f), of such function classes. The key idea behind the compression framework
presented in [1] is to show that there exists a finite function class G with low sample complexity and
a mapping that assigns a function g ∈ G to every f ∈ F such that the empirical loss is not severely
degraded. This trick allows us to bound the generalization error using the sample complexity of G
instead of F . A drawback of this method is that we are only able to bound L0(g)− L̂γ(f) instead of
the true generalization error original. Nevertheless, as the authors mentioned in [1], a similar issue is
present as well in standard PAC-Bayes bounds, where the bound is on a noisy version of f . Moreover,
the authors discuss some possible ways to solve this issue, but these approaches were left for future
work. In this paper we leverage such a compression framework by extending it to the case when an
adversary is present. Our goal is to bound the generalization error under the presence of an adversary.
We start by introducing some formal definitions and theorems, similar to the ones in [1]. All proofs
are deferred to the supplementary material.
Definition 1 ((γ, ε,S)-compressible). Given a set of parameter configurationsA, let GA = {gA|A ∈
A} be a set of parametrized functions gA. We say that the score function f ∈ F is (γ, ε,S)-
compressible through GA if
∀x ∈ S, y ∈ Y : |`ε(f ;x, y)− `ε(gA;x, y)| ≤ γ.
Theorem 1. Given the finite sets A and GA = {gA|A ∈ A}, if f is (γ, ε,S)-compressible via GA
then there exists A ∈ A such that with high probability
Lε0(gA) ≤ L̂εγ(f) +O
(√
log |A|
m
)
.
Corollary 1. In the same setting of Theorem 1, if f is compressible only for a fraction 1− δ of the
training sample, then with high probability
Lε0(gA) ≤ L̂εγ(f) +O
(√
log |A|
m
)
+ δ .
This main definition and following theorems are trivial extensions of the ones used in [1] to the
adversarial setting. However, even for the linear classifier, the main technique used in that work
for compressing f cannot be applied to the setup of this paper without incurring into explicit
dimensionality dependencies in the resulting bounds. This will be explained in detail in the next
section.
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3 Main Results
In this section we introduce our main results. We start with linear classifiers on binary classification
and move forward to neural networks and multi-class classification.
3.1 Linear Classifier
We start with a linear classifier for binary labels. Assume that x ∈ Bn∞,1, y ∈ {1, 2} and let
w = (w1, . . . , wn)
T be a vector of weights of a linear classifier. Then the score function of the linear
classifier is given by
fw(x) =
(
0
〈w,x〉
)
.
This simplifies the margin to `(f ;x, y) = (2y − 3) 〈w,x〉, which leads to
`ε(fw;x, y) = (2y − 3)(〈w,x〉 − ε ‖w‖1) .
Note that (2y − 3) ∈ {−1,+1}. The weight vector w ∈ Rn of this classifier, with margin γ, can
be compressed into another ŵ such that both classifiers make the same predictions with reasonable
probability (see supplementary material). Given δ ∈ (0, 1], the compressed classifier ŵ is constructed
entry-wise as ŵi = ziwi/pi where pi = (1 + ε)2 |wi| /δγ2 and zi ∼ Bern (pi). Such classifier
ŵ outputs the same prediction as w with probability 1− δ and has only O ((log n)(1 + ε2)/δγ2)
non-zero entries with high probability. By discretizing ŵ we obtain a compression setup that maps
w into a discrete set but fails with probability δ. Therefore, we can apply Corollary 1 and choose
δ =
(
(1 + ε)2/γ2m
)1/3
, which yields a generalization bound of order O˜ (((1 + ε)2/γ2m)1/3) (see
the supplementary material for more details). This approach is fairly similar to the original one in
the work of Arora et al. [1], but the pi values are chosen differently in order to deal with the new
term ε ‖w‖1 that appears in the margin’s expression. The result of the previous section provides a
dimension-free bound1. However, that bound scales with m1/3 instead of
√
m since the compression
approach fails with probability δ. To tackle this issue, Arora et al. [1] proposed a compression
algorithm based on random projections. In their setup, this technique works due to a famous corollary
of Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma that shows that we can construct random projections which preserve
the inner 〈w,x〉. In addition, since the Euclidean inner product can be induced by the `2-norm, the
`2-norm of w is preserved as well. However, in this setup we would need a random projection that
preserves ‖w‖1 and 〈w,x〉 at the same time, which seems unattainable unless additional assumptions
are made. We therefore propose to assume an effective sparsity bound on w, which is defined as
follows.
Definition 2 (Effective s-sparsity). A vector w ∈ Rn is effectively s-sparse, with s ∈ [1, n], if
‖w‖1/2 ≤ s ‖w‖1 .
Note that all s-sparse vectors are effectively s-sparse as well, but not vice-versa. Assuming that w is
effectively sparse allows us to compress it by simply setting its lowest entries to zero. The following
lemma provides a tight bound on the error, in the `1 sense, that is caused by this process.
Lemma 1 ([9]: Theorem 2.5). For any w ∈ Rn the following inequalities hold:
inf {‖w − z‖1 : z is s-sparse} ≤
1
4s
‖w‖1/2 ,
inf {‖w − z‖∞ : z is s-sparse} ≤
1
s
‖w‖1 .
In both cases the infimum is attained when z is an s-sparse vector whose non-zero entries are the
s-largest absolute entries of w.
For any effectively s-sparse classifier w with margin γ, this lemma allows us to compress it into a
vector ŵ, with only O(s(1 + ε)/γ) non-zero entries, such that the both classifiers assign the same
label to any input. Since this compression approach does not fail, we can discretize ŵ and apply
Theorem 1. This allows to prove the following generalization bound for the linear classifier in the
presence of an adversary.
1Except for logarithmic terms.
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Theorem 2. Let w be any linear classifier with ‖w‖1/2 / ‖w‖1 ≤ s, and margin γ > 0 on the
training set S. Then, if |S| = m, with high probability the adversarial risk is bounded by
Lε0(fŵ) ≤ L̂εγ(fw) + O˜
(√
(1 + ε)s
γm
)
,
where O˜(·) ignores logarithmic factors.
This result provides a bound with no explicit dimension dependence. Moreover, we observe that the
presence of an adversary only increases the sample complexity by a factor (1 + ε).
3.2 Neural Networks
Due to the `∞-norm bound on the perturbation η, in this work the mixed (1,∞)-norm of the
weight matrices plays a central role. As an example let us consider a linear classifier in multi-class
classification, that is f(x) =W Tx. Then, a perturbation η can perturb the score function at most
sup
‖η‖∞≤1
∥∥∥W Tη∥∥∥
∞
=
∥∥∥W T∥∥∥
∞
= ‖W ‖1,∞ .
The last equality comes from the properties of operator norms, see [30] for more details. Similar
statements can be made for the layers of a neural network with 1-Lipschitz activation functions. Let
us start by defining a d-layered fully connected neural network as
xi := φ(W i
T
xi−1) , ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , d , (1)
where φ is a 1-Lipschitz activation function applied entry-wise, x0 := x and f(x) := xd. Then, the
following lemma allows us to quantify how much error is incurred by perturbing the input of a layer,
or by switching the matrixW to a different one.
Lemma 2. If φ is a 1-Lipschitz activation function, then for anyW , Ŵ the following inequalities
hold ∥∥∥φ(W Tx)− φ(W T (x+ η))∥∥∥
∞
≤ ‖W ‖1,∞ ‖η‖∞ ,∥∥∥φ(W Tx)− φ(Ŵ Tx)∥∥∥
∞
≤
∥∥∥W − Ŵ∥∥∥
1,∞
‖x‖∞ .
Following the steps of Section 3.1, we now impose some conditions onW that allow us to efficiently
compress it into another matrix Ŵ which belongs to a potentially small set. To that end, let us start
by introducing the notion of effective joint sparsity.
Definition 3 (Effective joint sparsity). A matrix W ∈ Rn1×n2 is effectively joint s-sparse, with
s ∈ [1, n2], if
‖W ‖1,1 ≤ s ‖W ‖1,∞ .
Any matrix with s non-zero columns is effectively joint s-sparse as well. Given a matrix W =
(w1, . . . ,wn) is effectively joint s-sparse if and only if effective joint sparsity can be seen as a type
of effective sparsity condition on the vector (‖w1‖1 , . . . , ‖wn‖1)T. A consequence of Lemma 1 is
that we can compress effectively joint-sparse matrices by setting to zero their columns with lowest
`1-norm. For example, assume that W ∈ Rn1×n2 is an effective joint s-sparse matrix and that Ŵ
is constructed by setting to zero all columns ofW except for its s largest in the `1 sense. Then, by
Lemma 1, we can bound the ‖·‖1,∞ error as∥∥∥W − Ŵ∥∥∥
1,∞
≤ 1
s
‖W ‖1,1 ≤
s
s
‖W ‖1,∞ .
The resulting compressed matrix Ŵ would have only s non-zero columns instead of the original
n2. However, every column has potentially n1 non-zero values. In order to compressW further we
assume that each one of its columns has bounded effective sparsity as well. In summary, effective joint
sparsity allows us to reduce the number of non-zero columns in a matrix, while effective sparsity of
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Algorithm 1 MatrixCompress (·, γ)
Require: γ > 0 and W ∈ Rn1×n2 with ‖W ‖1,∞ = 1, effectively s1-sparse columns and is
effectively joint s2-sparse
Ensure: ∥∥∥W − Ŵ∥∥∥
1,∞
≤ γ ,
where Ŵ belongs to a discrete setW such that log |W| ≤ O˜
(
‖W ‖21,∞ s1s2/γ2
)
Choose s1 = 3 ‖W ‖1,∞ s1/4γ and s2 = 3 ‖W ‖1,∞ s2/γ
LetW ∈ Rn1×n2 be obtained by setting to zero the columns ofW except for the s2 columns with
largest `1 norm
Let W˜ ∈ Rn1×n2 be constructed by keeping the s1 largest values of every column of W and
setting to zero the other entries
LetW be the set all possible W˜
Let Ŵ be the closest matrix in the ‖·‖1,∞ sense to the covering set ofW with
∥∥∥W˜ − Ŵ∥∥∥
1,∞
≤
γ/3
Return: Ŵ
the columns allows us to reduce the number of non-zero elements that each of the non-zero columns
may have. Finally, discretization is handled using a standard covering number argument. Putting all
together into the following compression algorithm (Algorithm 1) allows us to mapW into a discrete
set while keeping the ‖·‖1,∞ error bounded.
By construction, using this algorithm guarantees that the error is bounded, as stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. LetW be an effectively joint s2-sparse matrix with effectively s1-sparse columns, such
that ‖W ‖1,∞ ≤ 1. If Ŵ = MatrixCompress (W , γ), then∥∥∥W − Ŵ∥∥∥
1,∞
≤ γ ,
where Ŵ belongs to a discrete set C such that log |C| ≤ O˜
(
‖W ‖21,∞ s1s2/γ2
)
.
From this lemma we can see that the set of possible compressed matrices has reasonable size.
Moreover, approximately sparse matrices can be compressed efficiently. This result leads us to the
main contribution of this paper, which is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Assume x ∈ Bn∞,1. Let fW be a d-layer neural network with ReLU activations, and
effectively joint sj2-sparse weight matrices with effectively s
j
1-sparse columns for j = 1, . . . , d. Let
us assume that the network is rebalanced so that
∥∥W 1∥∥
1,∞ = · · · =
∥∥∥W d∥∥∥
1,∞
= 1. Then, given
γ > 0 and ε < γ/4, there exists a finite function set G composed of the functions f
Ŵ
such that for
any fW the adversarial risk is bounded as
Lε0(fŴ ) ≤ L̂εγ(fW ) + O˜

√√√√√ d
m
(
1 + γ/2− ε
γ/2− 2ε
)2 d∑
j=1
√
sj1s
j
2
2

with high probability.
This result proves a bound with no explicit dimension dependence, which is also independent from
the number of classes. On the other hand, there seems to be an unavoidable dependence with
√
d.
However, this dependence is also present in the bounds for multi-layer neural networks, derived in
related works [12, 31].
Finally, we conduct a experiment to corroborate these findings. To that end, we train a fully
connected neural network of 3 layers with ReLU activations on the MNIST dataset. Af-
ter preprocessing, the inputs are 1024-dimensional vectors with `∞ norm bounded by one.
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training
train err
test err
train err (adv)
train err (adv)
bound (diff. scale)
Figure 1: Generalization bound for a vanilla neural
network on the MNIST dataset. Adversarial train-
ing improves the bound while standard training
does not.
The weight matrices are of size 1024 × 500,
500× 150 and 150× 10. To estimate the adver-
sarial risk, we use the projected gradient descent
(PGD) attack [16] with `∞-norm bounded by
0.2 and perturbations computed through 10 iter-
ations of the PGD algorithm. This PGD method
is the state of the art algorithm for adversarial
training.
In figure 1 the network is first trained without us-
ing adversarial examples. Then, after 50% of the
training time, we start introducing adversarial
examples to training set. These is carried out us-
ing the PGD method as described above, except
for 0.2 bound on the perturbation’s `∞-norm.
Instead, we start with a 0.05 norm bound and
slowly increase it until reaching 0.2. The script
for this experiment is given as supplementary
material. We can see our result from Theorem
3 correlates well with the adversarial risk, as it
starts decreasing when adversarial training be-
gins. Additionally, we compute the effective
0 20 40 60 80 100
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0
100
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start of
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training
Layer 1
eff. sparsity s¯1
eff. joint sparsity s¯2
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Figure 2: Experiment on the MNIST dataset. Effective sparsity and effective joint sparsity of the
weight matrices, at every layer, of a vanilla neural network. These quantities tend to improve with
adversarial training.
sparsity and effective joint sparsity of the weight matrices. In Figure 2, we see how these quantities
correlate well with the adversarial risk as well. These findings show that inducing sparsity on weight
matrices does not only provide robustness, it also improves generalization of neural networks.
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A Deferred Proofs
Proof. (Theorem 1) Since L̂ε0(gA) is an average of m i.i.d random variables with expectation equal to Lε0(gA)
we may use Hoeffdingen’s inequality, yielding
P(x,y)∼D
[
L̂ε0(gA)− Lε0(gA) ≥ τ
]
≤ exp (−2mτ2) .
Note that |A| = exp(log |A|). Then, let us choose τ =
√
log|A|
m
and take an union bound over all A ∈ A,
leading to
P(x,y)∼D
[
L̂ε0(gA)− Lε0(gA) ≥
√
log |A|
m
]
≤ exp(log |A|) exp (−2 log |A|) = exp(− log |A|) .
Since f is (γ, ε,S)-compressible via g, then
∀x ∈ S : |`ε(f ;x, y)− `ε(gA;x, y)| ≤ γ ,
which implies that
L̂ε0(gA) ≤ L̂εγ(f) .
Combining these results we get that
Lε0(gA) ≤ L̂εγ(f) +O
(√
log |A|
m
)
with probability at least 1− exp(− log |A|) = 1− 1/ |A|, which we consider as high probability.
Definition 4 (CompressVector(γ,w)). Given w ∈ Bn1,1, δ ∈ (0, 1], γ > 0 and ε > 0, let us define the
random mapping CompressVector(γ, ·) which outputs ŵ = (ŵ1, . . . , ŵn)T = CompressVector(γ,w) as
follows
ŵi = ziwi/pi , with zi ∼ Bern(pi) and pi = |wi|
δγ2
(1 + ε)2 ,
where Bern(pi) denotes the Bernoulli distribution with probability pi.
Lemma 4. Given w ∈ Bn1,1, δ ∈ (0, 1], γ > 0 and ε > 0. If ŵ = CompressVector(γ,w) then
∀x ∈ Bn∞,1, y ∈ Y : Pŵ [|`ε(fw;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)| ≥ γ] ≤ δ ,
and the number of non-zero entries in ŵ is less than O((logn)(1 + ε)2/δγ2) with high probability.
Proof. (of Lemma 4)
Note that E[ŵi] = wipi E[zi] = wi thus E[ŵ] = w. Similarly, E[|ŵi|] =
∣∣∣wipi ∣∣∣E[zi] = |wi| and since ŵi’s are
independent we get E[‖ŵ‖1] = ‖w‖1. This implies that
E`ε(fŵ;x, y) = E
[〈ŵ,x〉 − ε ‖ŵ‖1] = 〈w,x〉 − ε ‖w‖1 = `ε(fw;x, y) .
Now lets compute the variance of ŵi as
Var [ŵi] = E
[
ŵ2i
]− E [ŵi]2 = (wi/pi)2pi − w2i = 1− pi
pi
w2i .
The same calculation yields
Var [|ŵi|] = 1− pi
pi
w2i .
The covariance between |ŵi| and ŵi is
Cov (|ŵi| , ŵi) = E [|ŵi|ŵi]− E[|ŵi|]E[ŵi] = 1− pi
pi
|wi|wi .
Now putting all together we get
Var [ŵixi − ε|ŵi|] = x2iVar[ŵi]− 2εxiCov(ŵi, |ŵi|) + ε2Var[|wi|2]
=
1− pi
pi
(
x2iw
2
i − 2εxi|wi|wi + ε2w2i
)
≤ w
2
i
pi
(
x2i + 2ε|xi|+ ε2
)
=
δγ2
(1 + ε)2
|wi|
(
x2i + 2ε|xi|+ ε2
)
.
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Since ŵi’s are independent, we get
Var
[〈ŵ,x〉 − ε ‖ŵ‖1] = Var
[
n∑
i=1
ŵixi − ε|ŵi|
]
=
n∑
i=1
Var [ŵixi − ε|ŵi|]
≤ δγ
2
(1 + ε)2
n∑
i=1
|wi|
(
x2i + 2ε|xi|+ ε2
)
=
δγ2
(1 + ε)2
(〈|w|,x2〉+ 2ε 〈|u|, |c|〉+ ε2 ‖w‖1) (x2 is entry-wise)
≤ δγ
2
(1 + ε)2
(‖w‖1 ∥∥x2∥∥∞ + 2ε ‖w‖1 ‖x‖∞ + ε2 ‖w‖1)
≤ δγ
2
(1 + ε)2
(1 + 2ε+ ε2) = δγ2 .
By Chebyshev’s inequality we get
P
[|(〈ŵ,x〉 − ε ‖ŵ‖1)− 〈w,x〉 − ε ‖w‖1 | > γ] ≤ δ .
On the other hand the expected number of non-zero entries in ŵ is given by
E
[‖ŵ‖0] = n∑
i=1
pi =
n∑
i=1
|wi|
δγ2
(1 + ε2) =
(1 + ε)2
δγ2
.
Then, by Hoefdingen’s inequality the number of non-zero entries in ŵ is less than O((logn)(1 + ε)2/δγ2)
with high probability.
Now we handle discretization by clipping and then rounding in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let us define
• w′ component-wise as w′i = wi1
(
|wi| ≥ γ4n(1+ε)
)
,
• w˜ = CompressVector(γ/2,w′),
• ŵ is obtained by rounding each entry of w˜ to the nearest multiple of γ
2n(1+ε)
.
Then we have that
∀x ∈ Bn∞,1, y ∈ Y : Pŵ [|`ε(fw;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)| ≥ γ] ≤ δ .
Proof. (of Lemma 5) We start by bounding the error incurred by clipping, that is
|`ε(fw;x, y)− `ε(fw′ ;x, y)| ≤
∣∣〈w,x〉 − 〈w′,x〉∣∣+ ε ∣∣‖w‖1 − ∥∥w′∥∥1∣∣
≤ ∣∣〈w −w′,x〉∣∣+ ε ∥∥w −w′∥∥
1
≤ ∥∥w −w′∥∥
1
‖x‖∞ + ε
∥∥w −w′∥∥
1
≤ ∥∥w −w′∥∥
1
(1 + ε)
≤ γ
4n(1 + ε)
n(1 + ε) = γ/4 .
Similarly, the error incurred by discretizing w˜ is bounded by
|`ε(fw˜;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)| ≤ ‖w˜ − ŵ‖1 (1 + ε)
≤ γ
2n(1 + ε)
n
2
(1 + ε) = γ/4 .
By Lemma 4 we know that with probability at least 1− δ we have that |`ε(fw˜;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)| ≤ γ/2.
Combining these three results yields
|`ε(fw;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)| ≤ |`ε(fw;x, y)− `ε(fw′ ;x, y)|
+ |`ε(fw′ ;x, y)− `ε(fw˜;x, y)|
+ |`ε(fw˜;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)|
≤ γ/4 + γ/2 + γ/4 ≤ γ
with probability at least 1− δ.
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Theorem 4. With high probability
Lε0(fŵ) ≤ L̂εγ(fw) + O˜
((
(1 + ε)2
γ2m
)1/3)
,
where O˜(·) ignores logarithmic factors.
Proof. (of Theorem 4]) Let A be the set of vectors with at most O((logn)(1 + ε)2/δγ2) non-zero entries,
where each entry is a multiple of 2γ/2n(1 + ε) between −δγ2/(1 + ε)2 and δγ2/(1 + ε)2. Then |A| = rq
with
r = 2
δγ2/(1 + ε)2
2γ/2n(1 + ε)
=
4nδγ
(1 + ε)
, q =
(1 + ε)2
δγ2
.
Let ŵ be defined as in Lemma 5. Then, by Lemma 4 we have that Pŵ[ŵ ∈ A] ≤ 1 − δ. We define
G = {fŵ : ŵ ∈ A}. Note that the mapping from fw to fŵ fails (i.e., ŵ /∈ A) with probability at most δ, thus
corollary 1 yields
Lε0(fŵ) ≤ L̂εγ(fw) +O

√√√√ (1 + ε)2 log(n) log ( 4nδγ(1+ε))
δγ2m
+ δ = L̂εγ(fw) + O˜
(√
(1 + ε)2
δγ2m
)
+ δ
with high probability. Then, we choose δ = ((1 + ε)2/γ2m)1/3 which leads to
Lε0(fŵ) ≤ L̂εγ(fw) + O˜
((
(1 + ε)2
γ2m
)1/3)
with high probability.
Lemma 6. Given an effectively s-sparse vectorw ∈ Bn1,1, let us definew′ ∈ Bn1,1 as the s-sparse vector whose
non-zero entries are the s-largest absolute entries of w. In addition, the vector ŵ is obtained by rounding each
entry of w′ to the nearest multiple of γ/s(1 + ε). If we choose s = s(1 + ε)/2γ then
∀x ∈ Bn∞,1, y ∈ Y : |`ε(fw;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)| ≤ γ .
Proof. (of Lemma 6) Let us first bound how much does sparsifying w affects inner products, that is∣∣〈w,x〉 − 〈w′,x〉∣∣ ≤ ∥∥w −w′∥∥
1
‖x‖∞ ≤
∥∥w −w′∥∥
1
.
This distorts the adversarial margin as follows:
|`ε(fw;x, y)− `ε(fw′ ;x, y)| ≤
∣∣〈w,x〉 − 〈w′,x〉∣∣+ ε ∣∣‖w‖1 − ∥∥w′∥∥1∣∣
≤ ∥∥w −w′∥∥
1
+ ε
∥∥w −w′∥∥
1
(triangle inequality)
= (1 + ε)
∥∥w −w′∥∥
1
≤ (1 + ε) 1
4s
‖w‖1/2 (Lemma 1)
≤ (1 + ε) s
4s
‖w‖1 (Definition of effective sparsity)
= γ/2 . (Choice of s)
Similarly,
|`ε(fw′ ;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)| ≤ (1 + ε)
∥∥w′ − ŵ∥∥
1
≤ (1 + ε)s1
2
(
γ
s(1 + ε)
)
= γ/2 .
Putting all together we get
|`ε(fw;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)| ≤ |`ε(fw;x, y)− `ε(fw′ ;x, y)|+ |`ε(fw′ ;x, y)− `ε(fŵ;x, y)|
≤ γ/2 + γ/2 = γ.
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Proof. (of Theorem 2) Let A be the set of vectors with at most s(1 + ε)/2γ non-zero entries, where each entry
is a multiple of γ/s(1 + ε) between −1 and 1. Then |A| = rq with
r =
2
γ/s(1 + ε)
=
2
γ2/2s(1 + ε)2
=
4s(1 + ε)2
γ2
, q = s = s(1 + ε)/2γ .
Let G = {fŵ : ŵ is defined as in Lemma 6 with w ∈ Bn1,1}. Then, by Lemma 6 we know that fw is (γ, ε,S)-
compressible via G, thus Theorem 1 yields
Lε0(fŵ) ≤ L̂εγ(fw) +O

√√√√2s(1 + ε) log ( 4s(1+ε)2γ2 )
γm
 = L̂εγ(fw) + O˜
(√
(1 + ε)s
γm
)
with high probability.
Proof. (of Lemma 2) Since φ is 1-Lipschitz we have that for any vector w of the same size as η it holds
|φ(〈w,x〉)− φ(〈w,x+ η〉)| ≤ |〈w,η〉| ≤ ‖w‖1 ‖η‖∞ ≤ ε ‖w‖1 .
This proves the first inequality of the lemma. Similarly, for any w and ŵ it follows
|φ(〈w,x〉)− φ(〈ŵ,x〉)| ≤ |〈w − ŵ,x〉| ≤ ‖w − ŵ‖1 ‖x‖∞ ≤ B ‖w − ŵ‖1 ,
thus implying the second inequality.
Proof. ( of Lemma 3) SinceW is effectively joint sparse we can bound
∥∥W −W∥∥
1,∞ as follows∥∥W −W∥∥
1,∞ ≤
1
s2
‖W ‖1,1 (Lemma 1)
≤ s2
s2
‖W ‖1,∞ . (Definition of effective joint sparsity)
Similarly, since the remaining non-zero columnsW are effectively sparse we get∥∥∥W − W˜∥∥∥
1,∞
= inf
X:‖X‖0,∞=s1
∥∥W −X∥∥
1,∞
≤ 1
4s1
∥∥W∥∥
1/2,∞ (Lemma 1)
≤ s1
4s1
∥∥W∥∥
1,∞ . (Definition of effective sparsity)
By the definition of Ŵ we have that
∥∥∥W˜ − Ŵ∥∥∥
1,∞
≤ γ/3. Combining all these statements, the choice of s1
and s2 (see Algorithm 1) yields∥∥∥W − Ŵ∥∥∥
1,∞
≤ ∥∥W −W∥∥
1,∞ +
∥∥∥W − W˜∥∥∥
1,∞
+
∥∥∥W˜ − Ŵ∥∥∥
1,∞
≤ s1
4s1
‖W ‖1,∞ +
s2
s2
‖W ‖1,∞ +
γ
3
≤ γ
3
+
γ
3
+
γ
3
= γ .
It remains to bound the covering number ofW with the mixed (1,∞)-norm, denoted byN (W, ‖·‖1,∞ , γ/3).
By definition, the setW is composed of all matrices W˜ with at most s2 non-zero columns, where each column
has at most s1 non-zero entries and `1-norm not greater than one. Since any W˜ ∈ W has at most s2 non-zero
columns we get
N (W, ‖·‖1,∞ , γ/3) ≤
(
n2
s2
)
N (γ/3,Bn11,1 ∩ Bn10,s1 , ‖·‖1)s2
≤
(
n2
s2
)[(
n1
s1
)
N (γ/3,Bs11,1, ‖·‖1)
]s2
≤
(
en2
s2
)s2 [(en1
s1
)s1
N (γ/3,Bs11,1, ‖·‖1)
]s2
≤
(
en2
s2
)s2 (en1
s1
)s1s2 (
1 +
6
γ
)s1s2
.
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This leads to
N (W, ‖·‖1,∞ , γ/3) ≤ O˜ (s1s2) = O˜
(
‖W ‖21,∞ s1s2/γ2
)
.
choosing C to be the covering set ofW completes the proof.
Proof. (of Theorem 3) Let us assume that φ is the ReLU-activation. Then, due to its positive homogeneity
property, we re-balance the network by setting
∥∥W i∥∥
1,∞ = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , d without altering the
classification function. For any given adversarial noise η1 with `∞ norm bounded by ε, let us re-define x
i as
in equation 1 but with x0 = x+ η1. Similarly, for another adversarial noise η2 with `∞-norm bounded by ε
and compressed matrices Ŵ
i
, let us define the error vector of the i-th layer ηi in a recursive fashion, that is
ηi := φ(W i
T
xi−1)− φ(Ŵ i
T
(xi−1 + ηi−1)) for i = 1, . . . , d with η0 := η2 − η1. Note that
∥∥η0∥∥∞ ≤ 2ε.
With this definition of xi, since∥∥∥φ(W iTxi−1)∥∥∥
∞
≤
∥∥∥W iTxi−1∥∥∥
∞
≤
∥∥∥W iT∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥xi−1∥∥∥
∞
=
∥∥∥W i∥∥∥
1,∞
∥∥∥xi−1∥∥∥
∞
we have that
∥∥xi∥∥∞ ≤ ∥∥x0∥∥∞∏ij=1 ∥∥W j∥∥1,∞ ≤ 1 + ε.
Our first goal is to bound
∥∥ηi∥∥∞ for i = 1, 2, . . . , d, which we do by induction. For any i > 0, let us
assume that
∥∥ηi−1∥∥ ≤ εi−1 where εi−1 is some positive value. Given some εi > εi−1, we compressW i as
Ŵ
i
= MatrixCompress((εi − εi−1)/(1 + ε+ εi−1),W i). Then, using Lemma 2 we get∥∥∥ηi∥∥∥
∞
=
∥∥∥∥φ(W iTxi−1)− φ(Ŵ iT(xi−1 + ηi−1))∥∥∥∥
∞
=
∥∥∥φ(W iTxi−1)− φ(W iT(xi−1 + ηi−1))∥∥∥
∞
+
∥∥∥∥φ(W iT(xi−1 + ηi−1))− φ(Ŵ iT(xi−1 + ηi−1))∥∥∥∥
∞
≤
∥∥∥W i∥∥∥
1,∞
∥∥∥ηi−1∥∥∥
∞
+
∥∥∥W i − Ŵ i∥∥∥
1,∞
∥∥∥xi−1 + ηi−1∥∥∥
∞
(Lemma 2)
≤ εi−1 +
∥∥∥W i − Ŵ i∥∥∥
1,∞
(1 + ε+ εi−1)
≤ εi . (Definition of Ŵ i)
Given y and fW , let us define f˜W (x) := [fW (x)]j 6=y . By setting ε0 := 2ε and εd := γ/2 we get∣∣`ε(fW ;x, y)− `ε(fŴ ;x, y)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣[fW (x+ η1)]y −maxj 6=y [fW (x+ η1)]j − [fŴ (x+ η2)]y +maxj 6=y [fŴ (x+ η2)]j
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣[fW (x+ η1)]y − ∥∥∥f˜W (x+ η1)∥∥∥∞ − [fŴ (x+ η2)]y + ∥∥∥f˜Ŵ (x+ η2)∥∥∥∞∣∣∣
≤ ∣∣[fW (x+ η1)]y − [fŴ (x+ η2)]y∣∣+ ∣∣∣∥∥∥f˜W (x+ η1)∥∥∥∞ − ∥∥∥f˜Ŵ (x+ η2)∥∥∥∞∣∣∣
≤ ∥∥fW (x+ η1)− fŴ (x+ η2)∥∥∞ + ∥∥∥f˜W (x+ η1)− f˜Ŵ (x+ η2)∥∥∥∞
≤ 2 ∥∥fW (x+ η1)− fŴ (x+ η2)∥∥∞
= 2
∥∥∥ηd∥∥∥
∞
≤ γ .
We are free to choose ε1, . . . , εd−1 without loosing this bound on
∣∣`ε(fW ;x, y)− `ε(fŴ ;x, y)∣∣, as long as
εi > εi−1. However, the choice of these values will determine the sample complexity of the compressed
function class. We choose these parameters as follows
ε0 := 2ε , εi := εi−1 +
√
si1s
i
2∑d
j=1
√
sj1s
j
2
(γ/2− 2ε) .
This rule allocates more error to the layers with more effective parameters 2. Note that this selection implies
εd = γ/2 and εi > εi−1, so fW is (γ, ε,S)-compressible via G = {fŴ : Ŵ = MatrixCompress((εi −
2A naive way of choosing εi like εi := i(γ/2− 2ε)/d+ 2ε will lead sample complexity of O(d2) instead
of O(d).
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εi−1)/(1 + ε+ εi−1),W )}. In the same manner as in Lemma 2, for all i = 1, . . . , d let us define Ci to be the
set of all possible Ŵ
i
. With this choice the logarithm of the logarithm of the cardinality of the compressed
function class is
log |G| = log
d∏
i=1
∣∣∣Ci∣∣∣ = d∑
i=1
log
∣∣∣Ci∣∣∣
≤ O˜
(
d∑
i=1
si1s
i
2(1 + ε+ ε
i−1)2/(εi − εi−1)2
)
≤ O˜

d∑
i=1
si1s
i
2(1 + ε+ γ/2− 2ε)2
(∑d
j=1
√
sj1s
j
2
)2
(
(γ/2− 2ε)
√
si1s
i
2
)2

= O˜

d∑
i=1
(1 + γ/2− ε)2
(∑d
j=1
√
sj1s
j
2
)2
(γ/2− 2ε)2

= O˜
d(1 + γ/2− ε
γ/2− 2ε
)2( d∑
j=1
√
sj1s
j
2
)2 .
Finally, we apply Theorem 1, yielding
Lε0(fŴ ) ≤ L̂εγ(fW ) + O˜

√√√√ d
m
(
1 + γ/2− ε
γ/2− 2ε
)2( d∑
j=1
√
sj1s
j
2
)2 .
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